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This dissertation aims to verify what is and if there is an impact of corporate 
governance on capital structure decisions. This is an approach for the Iberian 
Peninsula, using data of the Portuguese and Spanish companies listed on the 
Portuguese Stock Market (PSI 20) and Spanish Stock Market (IBEX 35). The 
selected firms were analyzed considering a 5-year period, from 2009 to 2013. 
The empirical results showed a statistically positive significant relationship only 
between the Debt Intensity and the number of board meetings held per year. 
However, when considering the Debt-to-Equity there was no statistically 
significant association with any independent variable. 
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Corporate governance is considered nowadays a critical mechanism of firm’s 
development and growth. The emergence of several recent collapses of 
companies such as Enron, Tyco, WorldCom or Parmalat, per example, 
enhanced the need of attention of corporate governance. These scandals 
alerted for the importance and magnitude associated to this topic. Following 
these events, the McKinsey & Company released in 2002 the Global Investor 
Opinion Survey aiming to indicate which are the most priority areas of corporate 
governance towards a general evolution. The release of this report showed how 
much investors value this subject. According to this survey, investors consider 
corporate governance and financial indicators equally important when 
evaluating investment decisions. A great percentage of these investors are 
willing to pay a premium for firms with higher levels of governance.  
The majority of previous studies on corporate governance focus on the impact 
of its mechanisms on the performance of the companies (Hermalin & Weisbach, 
1991; Bhagat & Black, 2002 or Yermack, 1996 per example). Regarding the 
impact of corporate governance on firm’s capital structure decisions there are 
few studies. This area is even less explored if we consider the analysis of 
European companies. 
Modigliani & Miller (1958) suggested the capital structure irrelevance principle, 
which means that there is not a relationship between the way a company is 
financed and its value. Following this study a large number of authors 
developed several studies and theories focused on capital structure decision 
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and on its influencing elements. The trade-off and pecking order theories are 
some of the tested capital structure theories. 
The purpose of this study is to verify the impact of the selected corporate 
governance mechanisms on firm’s capital structure. The selected mechanisms 
are related with the board of directors, namely the Board Size, the Board 
Independence, the proportion of Women on Board, the CEO-Chairman Duality 
and the Number of Board Meetings. The capital structure variables used on this 
dissertation are the Debt-to-Equity and the Debt Intensity.  
Using Debt-to-Equity ratio it was verified that none of the independent variables 
under analysis was statistically significant. On the other hand, when considering 
the other dependent variable -Debt Intensity- it was possible to observe 
statistically significant relationships. In this case, the Number of Board Meetings 
showed a positive significant relationship which means that the higher the 
number of meetings held in a year the higher the value for Debt Intensity. 
The structure of this dissertation is organized in five sections. The first section is 
the introduction, in order to frame the topic in analysis and to explain the 
dissertation’s purpose. The second section consists on the literature review of 
the previous relevant papers about this subject. In the third and fourth sections 
it is described the data, the variables used, the methodology employed and also 
the discussion of the empirical results. The final section concludes and presents 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Corporate Governance 
2.1.1 Context and definition 
The concept of corporate governance has been a very prominent topic over the 
past decades. The emergence of some relevant financial scandals as 
previously referred, together with the financial crisis in 2008 enhanced the 
importance of corporate governance worldwide. This was verified by the need of 
establishing some recommendations in codes such as Cadbury, in 1992, and 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 in the US.  
Corporate governance is defined in the Cadbury Report (1992, p.15) as “the 
system by which companies are directed and controlled”. The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2004, p.11) also contributed 
with the publication of corporate governance principles and defines it as “a set 
of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders 
and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure 
through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining 
those objectives and monitoring performance are determined”. Shleifer & 
Vishny (1997, p.737) assert that corporate governance “deals with the ways in 
which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return 
on their investment”. 
In Portugal, the Portuguese Securities Market Commission, the Comissão do 
Mercado de Valores Mobiliários (CMVM) (2005, p.1) believes that Corporate 
Governance is “the system of rules and codes of conduct relating to the 
management and control of companies.”  
João Ribeiro Corporate Governance and Capital Structure  
4 
 
2.1.2 Agency theory 
Berle & Means in 1932 with The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
triggered the study and development of an extensive literature about agency 
problems. They argued that there is a clear separation between ownership and 
control, since the interests of managers are not fully aligned with the interests of 
the owners of the company.  
Berle & Means (1932, p.64) focused on the inability of the owners to influence 
its property stating that “the position of ownership has changed from that of an 
active to that of a passive agent. In place of actual physical properties over 
which the owner could exercise direction and for which he was responsible, the 
owner now holds a piece of paper representing a set of rights and expectations 
to an enterprise.(…) The owner is practically powerless through his own efforts 
to affect the underlying property. The spiritual values that formerly went with the 
ownership have been separated from it”. 
Managers should act in a way to provide the maximization of returns to 
shareholders, through the increasing of profits and cash flows, in order to 
ensure that its interests are accomplished (Elliot, 2002). Nevertheless, following 
the work of Berle & Means (1932), Jensen & Meckling (1976, p.308) developed 
the agency theory considering that “an agency relationship is a contract under 
which one or more persons (the principal(s) engage another person (the agent) 
to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some 
decision making authority to the agent”. 
The authors focus on the contract between the two parties and explain the gap 
between the interests of the owner and the interests of the manager. They show 
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that managers tend to put less effort on the creation of value to the company as 
more equity is held by external investors. This creates a problem and conflict 
between ownership and control.  
Considering the agency problem, Shleifer & Vishny (1997) view this as a crucial 
element to the contracts. However they highlight the impossibility of writing 
complete contracts and the effects that derive from it. Three reasons may be 
listed for incomplete contracts, the difficulty to plan and predict accurately, the 
hard negotiation that the contracts may imply and possible difficulty of 
interpretation and enforcement by a third party (Hart, 1995). Aghion & Bolton 
(1992) refer that this topic of contractual incompleteness leads us again to the 
core issue, since due to this disagreements between the owner and the 
manager will always subsist. 
Himmelberg, Hubbard & Palia (1999) stated that agency problems are not the 
same and differ from firms, industries and cultures. McColgan (2001) supported 
this view and managed to continue the study of the principal-agent relationship 
and the costs that arise from it. The author argues that effective corporate 
governance mechanisms may contribute to help reducing those costs and that 
this governance may be shaped in line with the company environment. 
2.1.3 Corporate Governance in Portugal  
According to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004, p.13), “there 
is no single model of good corporate governance”. However, it is possible to 
identify and suggest several factors and elements that may contribute to proper 
governance. The highlight associated with the theme of corporate governance 
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and its importance lead to the emergence of certain best practices codes and 
other documents in several countries. 
In Portugal, in order to follow the OECD principles of corporate governance 
released in 1999, the CMVM also disclosed that same year a set of 
recommendations towards good corporate governance practices addressed to 
the Portuguese listed companies. The introduction of this code has undergone 
several changes and adjustments since 1999, which aimed to inform the market 
about the degree of compliance. Subsequently, it was introduced other 
information requirements like the denominated Comply or Explain principle. 
The main legislation regarding Portuguese institutions concerning the domain of 
corporate governance are the Portuguese Commercial Companies Code and 
the Portuguese Securities Code (Câmara, 2001). The first document aims to 
establish the principles and rules regarding the direction and control of 
commercial companies1. This code is focused on matters such as the 
composition, management, duties and competences of the management 
bodies, the rights and deliberations of the shareholders and also the companies’ 
supervision. 
The Portuguese Securities Code sets the rules applicable to the markets and 
related activities. It covers matters such as information disclosure duties or 
investors’ protection. 
Also, the Instituto Português de Corporate Governance (IPCG) published in 
2006 a document entitled Livro Branco sobre Corporate Governance em 
Portugal whose purpose was to provide a pedagogical instrument about 
                                                 
1
 This is not only addressed to the listed companies but rather to the five existing types of commercial 
companies: Limited Liability Company, Public Limited Liability Company, General Partnership, Limited 
Partnership, Limited Partnership with Share Capital. 
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corporate governance and its evolution and also to point a set of best practices 
towards greater governance efficiency. More recently the IPCG published on 30 
January 2013 a Corporate Governance Code with best practices on this 
subject, being an alternative to the CMVM code. 
The Universidade Católica Portuguesa at the request of the Associação de 
Empresas Emitentes de Valores Cotados em Mercado (AEM), developed 
annual reports regarding corporate governance in Portugal. According to these 
reports Portuguese companies have been following a positive trend concerning 
the degree of compliance, showing a notorious improvement on their practices 
of governance. 
2.1.4 Corporate Governance in Spain 
Similarly to what occurs in Portugal, corporate governance in Spain is regulated 
by the corporate legislation, composed by the Companies Law and also by the 
Securities Market Law, which is more directed and related with corporate 
governance practices. 
Feeling the need and importance of improving and stabilize the governance of 
the Spanish listed firms the Olivencia Committee drafted the first code in Spain, 
focused on the board of directors. It was denominated as Olivencia Code of 
Corporate Governance and it was published in 1998. This was about the same 
time that the OECD disclosed the first code of corporate governance principles. 
It shows how critical this period was for the reformulation of corporate 
governance worldwide.  
In 2003, the Aldama Code was created by the Aldama Committee and extended 
the scope of the first code. Although the characteristic of voluntariness, subject 
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to the principle of Comply or Explain, there was a greater control and stiffness 
over the companies in order to force them to act according to the compulsory 
legislation. 
The last and current version of the code adopted in Spain for corporate 
governance related issues was presented in 2006. This code, entitled as the 
Unified Code, takes into account the recommendations of the previous two 
codes (Olivencia and Aldama codes).  
As stated by Paredes (2013), one can verify that in 2011 there is a very 
significant degree of compliance with the recommendations of the Unified Code 
by the Spanish companies. Considering all the Spanish listed companies, 81.3 
per cent of the recommendations were complied with and 7.6 per cent of the 
recommendations were partially complied with. If we consider only the 
companies included in the Iberia Index (IBEX 35), the Spanish Stock Index, the 
numbers were comprehensibly better, with only 4.7 per cent of the 
recommendations that were not complied with. 
2.2 Board Characteristics and Capital Structure 
2.2.1 Board Size 
Board size has been considered in several studies along the years as 
absolutely pivotal regarding the level of effectiveness of corporate governance 
(Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Wen et al., 2002). 
Fama & Jensen (1983) and Bhagat & Black (1999) have complementary views 
on how firm size may influence its board size. These authors consider that the 
more complex the operations and processes the greater the demand for board 
members. This is explained by the need to monitor managers’ decisions and 
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also the need for particular services. This views are consistent with previous 
findings (Yermack, 1996) that points to a positively relationship between board 
size and firm size. 
In contrast, Lipton & Lorsch (1992) argue that a larger board may lead to less 
effectiveness when comparing to a smaller board. In other words, a larger board 
may cause problems regarding coordination despite the diversity of knowledge 
associated. 
Some authors have even recommended a preferred number for the limit of the 
board size having a similar opinion on the subject. Cadbury (1992) suggested a 
board size between eight and ten directors, while Lipton & Lorsch (1992) also 
recommend a limit of ten directors, rather eight or nine. Jensen (1993) believes 
that the board size should not exceed seven or eight members.  
Pfeffer & Salancick (1978) and Lipton & Lorsch (1992), suggest that there is a 
significant relationship between capital structure and board size. In line, Berger 
et al. (1997) assert that larger boards are associated with lower levels of 
leverage. 
Wen et al. (2002) finds positive but insignificant relationship between board size 
and capital structure2. Thus, it is proposed the following: 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between the Board Size 
and leverage (Debt-to-Equity and Debt Intensity) 
 
 
                                                 
2
 According to Anderson et al. (2004) larger boards may benefit from lower cost of debt, due to a more 
effective monitoring perceived by the lenders. 
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2.2.2 Board Independence 
The degree of independence of the board of directors is a core topic on 
corporate governance. This variable is considered one of the most important 
board characteristics due to its impact on the firm. Board Independence is 
guaranteed when there are a significant proportion of directors that do not work 
or have worked in the company and neither has or had business relationships 
directly or indirectly.  
The increase of board independence has been generally encouraged as a way 
to improve board monitoring. The CMVM recommends to the Portuguese listed 
companies the existence of a minimum of 25% of independent directors on the 
board. In Spain, the recommendation of the Spanish Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV) targets 
for a minimum of 1/3 of independent directors of the total number of directors on 
the board. 
Weisbach (1988) considers that the monitoring over top managers is more 
intense when there is a presence of outside or independent directors, which is 
also reinforced by Berger et al. (1997). 
Ferreira et al. (2012) found a significantly positive relationship between leverage 
and the number of independent directors. Anderson et al. (2004) also studied 
this variable and suggested that Board Independence is negatively related with 
debt financing costs. This is an interesting conclusion since it allows us to 
predict that this may lead to higher leverage due to a cheapest access to debt 
financing by the companies. Having in mind these empirical studies, it is 
hypothesized the following: 




Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between Board Independence and 
leverage (Debt-to-Equity and Debt Intensity) 
2.2.3 Women on Board 
Board diversity and specifically gender diversity on the boardroom has been a 
recurring theme concerning corporate governance, subject to intensive debate. 
Some guidelines and requirements have even been disclosed in order to 
attenuate the distribution of corporate board seats for male and female 
directors. The search for more diversity is, according to Carter et al. (2007), due 
to concerns of equality and fairness. These authors also consider that a 
diversified board enhances board independence and consequently managers’ 
monitoring3. 
Spain is one of the few European countries who actually have introduced strong 
policies concerning gender equality. In 2007, the Spanish government 
implemented the Equality Law which required listed companies to have 40 per 
cent female board representation by 2015. Also, CNMV recommends listed 
companies to include women with the required backgrounds on their boards. 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 in Appendix establish a comparison between the 
European Union (EU) countries regarding the representation of females on 
corporate boards and its evolution over the last years. Spain presents better 
levels of gender equality comparing to Portugal, being closer to the EU average. 
However, both countries have still to perform significant developments in order 
to approach the required gender balance. Grechaniuk (2009), found a negative 
                                                 
3
Board diversity is also likely to improve creativity, innovation, and to provide different perspectives 
contributing to increase effectiveness (Carter et al., 2003;van der Walt &Ingley, 2003) 
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and statistically significant relationship between the share of women in the 
executive board and the corporate capital structure. Thus, one can assume that 
women are more risk-averse, borrowing less money on behalf of the company.  
 
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative relationship between the proportion of 
Women on the Board and leverage (Debt-to-Equity and Debt Intensity) 
2.2.4 CEO-Chairman Duality 
The role of CEO and Chairman position by the same or different individuals is 
referred as CEO-Chairman Duality. Fama & Jensen (1983) discussed about this 
topic focusing on the separation between decision management and decision 
control4. The authors believe that a two-tier leadership5 is able to enhance 
board’s effectiveness, separating decision management and decision control 
components. Several authors (e.g. Brickley et al., 1997; Berg & Smith, 1978) 
consider that a one-tier leadership is more likely to cause agency problems. 
Fosberg (2004), although with statistically insignificant results, considers that 
companies with the two-tier structure generally have higher Debt-to-Equity 
ratios and are more likely to employ the optimal amount of debt in the capital 
structure. This may be related with the reduction of conflicts of interests and 
agency problems and therefore enhances the possibility of external credit. Abor 
(2007) also finds positive but insignificant relationship between leverage and 
CEO duality. Therefore, it is proposed the following: 
 
                                                 
4
 Decision management and decision control are part of the firm’s decision process. According to Fama & 
Jensen (1983) decision management are related with the functions of initiation and implementation of 
decisions and decision control with the part of ratification and monitoring of those decisions. 
5
 The CEO and Chairman positions are not held by the same individual. 
João Ribeiro Corporate Governance and Capital Structure  
13 
 
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between the CEO-
Chairman Duality and leverage (Debt-to-Equity and Debt Intensity) 
2.2.5 Number of Board Meetings 
The frequency of Board Meetings has been considered as an important element 
to guarantee the effectiveness of the board and its monitoring (Vafeas, 1999; 
Conger et al., 1998). Higher frequency of Board Meetings allows for better 
monitoring, to receive important information about the company and also plays 
a role on firm’s decisions. In Portugal and Spain it is even mandatory by the 
Portuguese (CMVM) and Spanish (CNMV) Securities and Exchange 
Commission for the companies to disclose the number of meetings held during 
the exercise. 
There are few studies including this variable when studying the impact of 
corporate governance on firm’s capital structure decisions. The existing studies 
are more focused on developing countries. Achchuthan et al. (2013) state that 
the impact of the number of Board Meetings on the capital structure is not 
significant. Rehman et al. (2010) considered several variables including Board 
Meetings frequency as proxy for corporate governance. These authors found 
that there is a positive but weak relationship between capital structure and 
corporate governance. It is proposed the following: 
 
Hypothesis 5: There is a positive relationship between the Number of 
Board Meetings and leverage (Debt-to-Equity and Debt Intensity) 
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3. Data description and Methodology 
3.1 Research data 
The sample for this analysis comprises 55 firms: 20 that were listed on the 
Portuguese Stock Market (PSI 20) and 35 that were listed on the Spanish Stock 
Market (IBEX 35) at the end of 2013. The selected firms were analyzed using 
an unbalanced panel considering a 5-year period, from 2009 to 2013, with a 
total of 269 observations.  
Thus, this dissertation do not consider the changes occurred in the composition 
of the indices but rather aims to focus on the companies that were included at 
the end of the selected period. The data was collected from the annual reports 
and accounts and from the governance reports of each of the selected firms.  
3.2 Definition of Variables 
This dissertation aims to verify the impact of some corporate governance 
mechanisms on capital structure of the firms. Using a multiple linear regression, 
the selected mechanisms are the board size, the percentage of independent 
directors and of women on the board, CEO duality and the number of board 
meetings. Considered as dependent variables are the Debt-to-Equity and the 
Debt Intensity, being also included control variables such as the age of the 
company, the number of employees and the sector of the firm. 
3.2.1 Dependent Variables 
Debt-to-Equity (DE) 
The DE ratio is used to see the capital structure of a firm (Fosberg, 2004). It is 
an indicator that measures the company’s financial leverage. It expresses the 
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relationship between the financing that comes from creditors and the financing 
that comes from investors (shareholders). Usually, a firm with higher DE ratio is 
viewed as being riskier since it relies more on creditors and may not be able to 





Debt Intensity (DI) 
The present Debt Intensity ratio is an alternative measure to the previously 
referred DE ratio to express the leverage of a company. This indicator 
measures the percentage of the total assets of the firm that is financed by the 
creditors. In this case, the higher the DI ratio is the greater the leverage of the 






This variable was used by several authors such as Wen et al. (2002), Ferreira 
et al. (2012) and Berger et al. (1997). 
3.2.2 Independent Variables 
Board Size (BS) 
This variable refers to the total number of board members, comprising the 
executive and non-executive directors. 
This variable has previously been used in the literature by authors such as 
Pfeffer & Salancick (1978), Lipton & Lorsch (1992), Berger et al. (1997) or Wen 
et al. (2002). 




Board Independence (BI) 
The independence of the board is measured as the ratio between the total 
number of independent directors and the total number of directors, representing 
the proportion of independent directors on board.  
Board independence has been used by several authors including Anderson et 
al. (2004), Berger et al. (1997) and Ferreira et al. (2012). 
 
Women on Board (WB) 
It reflects the proportion of women on board, and therefore corresponds to the 
ratio between the total number of women on board and the total number of 
board directors. 
 
CEO-Chairman Duality (CC) 
This variable is a dummy that equals to 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman of the 
company and 0 if otherwise. 
Fosberg (2004) and Abor (2007) were some of the authors who used this 
variable. 
 
Number of Board Meetings (BM) 
It corresponds to the total number of meetings held by the board in a year. 
There are few authors who use this variable on their analysis. Achchuthan et al. 
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3.2.3 Control Variables 
Age (A) 








Each company is included in a specific sector that is constituted by a group of 
companies that fall within the same market with the same or similar activities. 
This variable is regarded as a dummy variable in this model. 
3.3 Methodology 
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the relationship between some 
characteristics of the board and the capital structure of some of the listed 
Portuguese and Spanish firms for the 2009-2013 period.  
The analysis was performed using a multiple linear regression model using 
StataIC 12 software. The panel data in question is considered unbalanced, 
which means that there are no observations for some time periods in 
determined firms. At the time of the collection of the information not all 
companies had disclosed all the required data, which explains the unbalanced 
panel. 
 




The following equations represent the models to estimate: 
 
𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑊𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (1) 
𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑊𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (2) 
 
Regarding equations (1) and (2), we consider i = 1,2,...55 for the total number of 
companies of both indices and t = 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 that concerns 
the years concerned. 
As noted, the dependent variable is different in each of the two models 
considering on the first model the DE (equation 1) and on the second model the 
DI (equation 2). Both models include the independent variables (BS, ID, WB, 
CC, BM) and control variables (A, SI, SE). 
In equation (1) and (2), α is the constant term, the β’s are unknown parameters 
and represent the coefficients for the explanatory variables (or independent 
variables). Finally, ε is the error term or the residual, and it represents the 
difference between an actual and a predicted value for the dependent variable. 
The estimation was performed using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), the 
Fixed Effects (FE) and the Random Effects (RE) methods. The OLS is more 
restrictive than the other two methods, considering a constant individual effect. 
It also assumes that the error term and the independent or explanatory 
variables are uncorrelated. 
FE method considers that there are multiple constants (α is different for each 
individual), thus it assumes that these individuals are heterogeneous which 
means that their characteristics should not be correlated. Aiming to remove the 
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individual’s time-invariant characteristics, the FE assumes the correlation 
between the error term and the independent variables.  
Regarding the RE method, unlike the FE, the unobserved individual 
heterogeneity (or individual effect) is considered random and uncorrelated with 
the independent variables. Greene (2008) believes that the main difference 
between FE and RE is based on the existence (or not) of correlation between 
the elements integrated on the unobserved individual effect and the 
independent variables and not on the degree of randomness of these effects. 
The Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) is performed in order to decide whether to 
use FE or RE. It verifies which model is the most efficient, making sure of the 
consistency of the results of both models. The null hypothesis is that there is no 
correlation between the specific errors and the independent variables (RE is the 
more suitable model) and the alternative states the opposite (FE is the more 
suitable model). 
All the regressions were performed using robust standard errors. The main 
purpose for this option is to prevent heteroscedasticity. 
3.3.2 Summary of Expected Signals 
Table I – Expected signals for the Independent Variables 
 
Independent Variables Symbol 
Equations 
(1) (2) 
Board Size BS + + 
Board Independence BI + + 
Women on Board WB - - 
CEO-Chairman Duality CC + + 
Number of Board Meetings BM + + 
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4. Analysis and discussion of Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics of the dependent, independent and control variables 
for the combined companies of PSI 20 and IBEX 35 are presented on Table II. 
 
Table II – Descriptive statistics of variables for Portuguese and Spanish companies  
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
DE 269 12,977 153,043 -22,107 2511,667 
DI 269 0,365 0,185 0 0,951 
BS 266 14,177 4,711 5 27 
BI 262 0,419 0,211 0 0,890 
WB 264 0,110 0,091 0 0,440 
CC 262 0,469 0,500 0 1 
BM 259 10,490 3,735 4 31 
A 273 38,725 40,614 0 221 
SI 267 9,353 1,616 6,455 12,561 
 
Notes: DE = Total Debt / Total Shareholder's Equity; DI = Total Debt / Total Assets; BS: Total number of 
directors; BI: Percentage of the board composed by independent directors; WB: Percentage of the board 
composed by women; CC: Considered as a dummy variable, in order to assess if the CEO and the 
Chairman are the same person or not; BM: Number of meetings held by the board per year; A: Number of 
years of existence of the company; SI: Natural logarithm of the number of firm's employees. 
 
The Mean of the DE ratio is 12,977, which is a significantly high value. This 
figure can be explained by the high percentage of companies that belong to the 
banking sector and to the heavy construction sector. These sectors typically use 
a greater amount of debt comparing to other industries and sectors.  
The DI ratio shows considerably lower values than the previously referred for 
the DE ratio. The mean of DI is 0,365, with a relatively low value for Standard 
Deviation which is 0,185. Board Size has a Mean of 14,177 directors per board. 
Recalling what was previously observed on the Literature Review we can verify 
that this value is considerably higher than the eight to ten board members range 
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pointed as ideal by several authors. However, looking for the values of Minimum 
of 5 and Maximum of 27 we can observe a great disparity of values, which is 
reinforced by the Standard Deviation of 4,711. Companies from the financial 
sector tend to have higher number of board directors comparing to the other 
sectors. 
The Mean of the proportion of Women on Board is 0,110, a very low value 
considering the objective of attenuate the actual differences and to promote 
gender equality6. 
Regarding the CEO-Chairman Duality the values allow us to conclude that there 
is not a clear trend followed by the companies included in both indices. The total 
Mean is 0,469 and the Standard Deviation of 0,500 which means that the 
proportion of companies with one-tier leadership and two-tier leadership is 
almost the same.  
The Number of Board Meetings variable shows a Mean of 10,490, a Standard 
Deviation of 3,735 and ranges between 4 and 31. 
Regarding the control variables, the Mean of Age is 38,7 years, ranging from a 
Maximum of 221 and a Minimum of 07. The variable Size has a Mean value of 
9,353. Considering specifically the Mean of the number of employees the value 
is 35.310 employees. 
Tables VII and VIII in Appendix show the differences between the values of the 
companies included on PSI 20 and IBEX 35. Summarizing, we can verify that 
the Mean of the Debt-to-Equity ratio is much higher in Spain, contrary to the 
                                                 
6
 On March 2011 the European Comission released the “Women on the Board Pledge for Europe” which 
aimed to increase the proportion of women on corporate boards to 30% by 2015 and 40% by 2020.  
7
 This value is related with the Spanish bank Bankia. This company was formed in 2010, during the period 
under review, which explains the value of 0.  
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variable of Debt Intensity which is generally higher in Portugal. The Mean of 
Board Size is similar in both cases but it is notorious that the values for the 
Portuguese Index are more disperse. The Spanish companies show generally 
higher levels of Board Independence and of presence of Women on Board. This 
can be explained by the imposition of quotas concerning female representation 
on the board. In Portugal it is verified more predominance of one-tier 
leaderships comparing to Spain. It is also noted that Spanish companies are 
generally bigger and hold more meetings but on the other hand are younger 
than Portuguese companies. 
4.2 Correlation Analysis 
Table III shows the coefficients correlation between the variables in analysis. 
 
Table III – Pearson Correlation Matrix for PSI 20 and IBEX 35 companies 
  DE DI BS BI WB CC BM A SI 
DE 1 
        DI 0.053 1 
       BS 0.058 -0.001 1 
      BI -0.035 -0.241*** -0.038 1 
     WB 0.110* 0.038 -0.267*** 0.218*** 1 
    CC -0.060 0.074 -0.141** 0.126** 0.137** 1 
   BM 0.043 0.304*** 0.013 0.033 0.153** 0.061 1 
  A 0.112* -0.079 0.127** 0.060 -0.088 -0.097 -0.092 1 
 SI 0.071 -0.187*** 0.243*** -0.309*** -0.021 0.028 -0.066 0.346*** 1 
 
Notes: DE = Total Debt / Total Shareholder's Equity; DI = Total Debt / Total Assets; BS: Total number of 
directors; BI: Percentage of the board composed by independent directors; WB: Percentage of the board 
composed by women; CC: Considered as a dummy variable, in order to assess if the CEO and the 
Chairman are the same person or not; BM: Number of meetings held by the board per year; A: Number of 
years of existence of the company; SI: Natural logarithm of the number of firm's employees. 
*, ** and ***, indicate statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Not all variables are statistically correlated, but there are some important 
correlations to highlight. According to the matrix it is possible to verify little8 
positive and significant (level of 10%) correlation between the dependent 
variable Debt-to-Equity and the proportion of Women on Board. 
The other dependent variable Debt Intensity shows significantly negative but 
still little correlation with Board Independence and also with Size. This variable 
verifies also a significantly positive low correlation with the independent variable 
Number of Board Meetings.  
Board Size presents significantly negative little correlation with the proportion of 
Women on Board and also with CEO-Chairman Duality, but in this case at a 
significance level of 5%. It is also verified a significantly positive little correlation 
between Board Size and Size and a positive little correlation between Board 
Size and Age at a significance level of 5%.  
The variable that is referred to Board Independence shows significantly positive 
little correlation with the proportion of Women on Board and positive little 
correlation with CEO-Chairman Duality at a significance level of 5%. It also 
shows a significantly negative low correlation with Size. 
The Women on Board variable presents a positive little correlation at a 
significance level of 5% with CEO-Chairman Duality and Number of Board 
Meetings. Finally, there is a significantly positive low correlation between the 
control variables Age and Size. 
                                                 
8
 The interpretation of the correlation coefficient applied is the suggested by Hinkle, Wiersma, &Jurs 
(2003). According to these authors,positive or negative values between 0 and 0,3 indicate little if any 
correlation, values between 0,3 and 0,5 indicate low correlation, values between 0,5 and 0,7 indicate 
moderate correlation, values between 0,7 and 0,9 indicate high correlation and values between 0,9 and 1 
indicate very high correlation.  
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Tables IX and X in Appendix show the existent correlations between the 
variables for each index. Looking at each matrix is possible to verify that there 
are few correlated variables on the IBEX 35, contrary to what is shown on the 
PSI 20. 
4.3 Regression Analysis Results 
In order to assess which is the most efficient model to use, between the Fixed 
Effects model and the Random Effects model, for each of the dependent 
variables, it was applied the Hausman Test. The application of this test provided 
the required output presented on Table IV. 
 





The results suggest that the most suitable model for both of the dependent 
variables is the FE. In both cases we can verify that the p-value is lower than 
0,05, which leads us to reject the null hypothesis, or in other words to reject the 
RE model and to use the FE model. Tables V and VI show the results of the 
multiple regression analysis, considering OLS model and FE model and also 
sector and time dummies as indicated on the table. 
The results presented on Table V show that there is not a statistically significant 
relationship between the dependent variable Debt-to-Equity and the other 
variables in analysis. This conclusion is valid for both models, the OLS model 
Dependent Variables X2 Prob> X2 
Debt-to-Equity 17,84 0,0127 
Debt Intensity 22,75 0,0019 
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and the FE model. We can also observe that the R2 is low in all the regressions, 
which means that the model explains little of the data variation. 
 
 







2,462 7.02 2.463 1.712 1.822 
(1,10) (1.06) (1.1) (0.41) (0.42) 
BI 
-73,664 35.65 -74.267 117.679 126.346 
(-1.09) (0.75) (-1.09) (0.85) (0.85) 
WB 
317.316 283.566 294.461 -70.512 -103.5 
(1.02) (1.01) (1.03) (-0.56) (-0.65) 
CC 
-20.973 -60.101 -18.512 -184.818 -183.59 
(-0.99) (-1) (-0.98) (-1.02) (-1.02) 
BM 
1.735 5.678 1.868 4.341 4.856 
(1.01) (0.96) (1.01) (0.86) (0.9) 
A 
0.406 0.636 0.393 7.515 11.22 
(1.02) (1) (1.03) (0.91) (0.97) 
SI 
5.129 -3.104 4.945 -22.289 -23.199 
(0.95) (-0.61) (0.94) (-0.72) (-0.72) 
Constant 
-96.265 -134.626 -97.794 -92.352 -220.957 
(-0.98) (-0.95) (-0.97) (-0.47) (-0.79) 
            
Sector dummy No Yes No No No 
Time dummy No No Yes No Yes 
            
R
2
 0,050 0.097 0.062 0,087 0.098 
N 249 249 249 249 249 
 
Notes: BS: Total number of directors; BI: Percentage of the board composed by independent directors; 
WB: Percentage of the board composed by women; CC: Considered as a dummy variable, in order to 
assess if the CEO and the Chairman are the same person or not; BM: Number of meetings held by the 
board per year; A: Number of years of existence of the company; S: Natural logarithm of the number of 
firm's employees. 
Values between parentheses reflect the t-statistics. 
*, ** and ***, indicate statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
On Table VI are presented the regression results considering the dependent 
variable Debt Intensity. The results reveal that there is a significant relationship 
between Debt Intensity and the Number of Board Meetings and also between 
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Debt Intensity and the variable of control Age. This means that the bigger the 
Number of Board Meetings the higher is the Debt Intensity ratio of the company. 
Higher monitoring, higher knowledge and full awareness about the situation of 
the company, may enhance a riskier approach by the board of directors.  
 







0.0004 0.005 0.0004 0.001 0.001 
(0.19) (1.55) (0.17) (0.22) (0.24) 
BI 
-0.208*** -0.089 -0.207*** 0.007 0.002 
(-4.10) (-1.31) (-4.08) (0.09) (0.03) 
WB 
0.047 0.044 0.074 0.016 0.032 
(0.43) (0.39) (0.65) (0.12) (0.23) 
CC 
0.028 0.068*** 0.025 0.023 0.024 
(1.23) (3.13) (1.1) (1.15) (1.14) 
BM 
0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
(5.72) (4.5) (5.69) (3.31) (3.21) 
A 
0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 -0.011** -0.012* 
(0.58) (0.79) (0.64) (-2.34) (-2.67) 
SI 
-0.014* -0.029*** -0.014 -0.006 -0.005 
(-1.68) (-3.2) (-1.63) (-0.39) (-0.3) 
Constant 
0.404*** 0.669*** 0.418*** 0.736*** 0.789*** 
(5.50) (7.24) (5.56) (3.81) (4.05) 
            
Sector dummy No Yes No No No 
Time dummy No No Yes No Yes 
            
R
2
 0.178 0.671 0.186 0.130 0.140 
N 249 249 249 249 249 
 
Notes: BS: Total number of directors; BI: Percentage of the board composed by independent directors; 
WB: Percentage of the board composed by women; CC: Considered as a dummy variable, in order to 
assess if the CEO and the Chairman are the same person or not; BM: Number of meetings held by the 
board per year; A: Number of years of existence of the company; S: Natural logarithm of the number of 
firm's employees. 
Values between parentheses reflect the t-statistics. 
*, ** and ***, indicate statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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It is verified that on the first regression there is not a significant relationship 
between Debt-to-Equity and the independent variables. This prevents to support 
the formulated hypothesis based on the past literature concerning this topic. 
On the opposite, when considering the dependent variable Debt Intensity, there 
is a significant positive relationship with the explanatory variable Number of 
Board Meetings. This finding supports the hypothesis formulated. Similar results 
were found by Rehman et al. (2010). 
5. Conclusions, Limitations and Future Research 
5.1 Conclusions 
In this dissertation, it is analyzed the impact of some of corporate governance 
variables, particularly those related with the board of directors, on the 
company’s capital structure. This study covers a five-year period from 2009 to 
2013 and targets the Iberian Peninsula, namely the companies included on the 
PSI 20 and IBEX 35 at the end of 2013. 
It aims to fill an existing gap concerning the relationship between an emergent 
topic such as corporate governance and a crucial subject regarding corporate 
decision management like the company’s capital structure. This type of 
research is not yet properly developed for European countries. Thus, this 
dissertation intends to provide an overview about how the Portuguese and 
Spanish corporate governance influences the company’s capital structure. This 
is a particularly interesting research considering the sensitive economic 
situation experienced in these countries.  
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The results provided by the multiple linear regression model suggest that 
leverage, namely Debt Intensity, and the Number Board Meetings held in a year 
have a positive relationship. This result supports some previous empirical 
studies on this area (Rehman et al., 2010).  
5.2 Limitations of the study and Further Research 
Corporate governance variables are difficult to obtain as it is time consuming, if 
hand collected, or not systematically available in databases. Hence, the 
database is restricted to listed firms, from Portugal and Spain. A larger dataset, 
including non-listed firms would certainly enrich the analysis, providing a more 
comprehensive and perhaps disruptive conclusion. The period of analysis was 
influenced by some critical and untypical economic situation. This fact may, 
without any doubt, influence the actual debt structure of the firms but it is not 
taken into consideration in the present study. 
As previously referred, the research related with the association between capital 
structure and corporate governance is still underdeveloped compared to the 
amount of studies regarding the impact of corporate governance on the firm’s 
performance. Having this in mind, it would be interesting to expand the analysis 
of the effects on capital structure on Europe. This would allow having a broader 
perception of this relationship on European countries. 
This dissertation was focused on some of the board characteristics. It would be 
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Figure 1 – Representation of women and men on the boards of large listed companies, 
April 2013 
Source: European Commission, Database on women and men in decision-making. 
 
 
Figure 2 – Change in the share of women and men on boards by country, October 
2010-April 2013 
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Table VII – Descriptive statistics of variables for PSI 20 companies 
 
Notes: DE = Total Debt / Total Shareholder's Equity; DI = Total Debt / Total Assets; BS: Total number of 
directors; BI: Percentage of the board composed by independent directors; WB: Percentage of the board 
composed by women; CC: Considered as a dummy variable, in order to assess if the CEO and the 
Chairman are the same person or not; BM: Number of meetings held by the board per year; A: Number of 
years of existence of the company; SI: Natural logarithm of the number of firm's employees. 
 
Table VIII – Descriptive statistics of variables for IBEX 35 companies 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
DE 172 16.987 191.361 -22.107 2511.667 
DI 172 0.336 0.190 0 0.951 
BS 166 13.886 3.494 8 24 
BI 165 0.487 0.190 0 0.890 
WB 164 0.135 0.090 0 0.440 
CC 162 0.568 0.497 0 1 
BM 164 10.835 3.454 5 31 
A 173 38.538 37.063 0 156 
SI 172 9.788 1.562 6.582 12.561 
 
Notes: DE = Total Debt / Total Shareholder's Equity; DI = Total Debt / Total Assets; BS: Total number of 
directors; BI: Percentage of the board composed by independent directors; WB: Percentage of the board 
composed by women; CC: Considered as a dummy variable, in order to assess if the CEO and the 
Chairman are the same person or not; BM: Number of meetings held by the board per year; A: Number of 









Variables N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
DE 97 5.867 8.887 0.022 55.077 
DI 97 0.416 0.166 0.020 0.817 
BS 100 14.66 6.219 5 27 
BI 97 0.305 0.195 0 0.778 
WB 100 0.069 0.078 0 0.278 
CC 100 0.310 0.465 0 1 
BM 95 9.895 4.127 4 19 
A 100 39.050 46.315 2 221 
SI 95 8.567 1.406 6.455 11.249 
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Table IX – Pearson Correlation Matrix for PSI 20 companies 
  DE DI BS BI WB CC BM A SI 
DE 1 
        DI 0.375*** 1 
       BS 0.179* -0.163 1 
      BI -0.102 -0.352*** 0.424*** 1 
     WB -0.002 0.235** -0.288*** -0.367*** 1 
    CC 0.141 0.363*** -0.285*** -0.196* 0.251** 1 
   BM 0.142 0.469*** 0.078 -0.232** 0.133 0.222** 1 
  A -0.138 -0.363*** 0 0.148 -0.170* -0.165 -0.308*** 1 
 SI -0.011 -0.377*** 0.379*** 0.455*** -0.317*** -0.393*** -0.183* 0.589*** 1 
 
Notes: DE = Total Debt / Total Shareholder's Equity; DI = Total Debt / Total Assets; BS: Total number of 
directors; BI: Percentage of the board composed by independent directors; WB: Percentage of the board 
composed by women; CC: Considered as a dummy variable, in order to assess if the CEO and the 
Chairman are the same person or not; BM: Number of meetings held by the board per year; A: Number of 
years of existence of the company; SI: Natural logarithm of the number of firm's employees. 
*, ** and ***, indicate statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
Table X – Pearson Correlation Matrix for IBEX 35 companies 
  DE DI BS BI WB CC BM A SI 
DE 1 
        
DI 0.064 1 
       
BS 0.095 0.116 1 
      
BI -0.066 -0.083 -0.475*** 1 
     
WB 0.125 0.068 -0.261*** 0.306*** 1 
    
CC -0.092 0.007 0.019 0.149* -0.055 1 
   
BM 0.048 0.268*** -0.051 0.132* 0.107 -0.093 1 
  
A 0.159** 0.090 0.301*** -0.005 -0.049 -0.055 0.096 1 
 
SI 0.076 -0.017 0.241*** 0.059 -0.143* 0.091 -0.094 0.240*** 1 
 
Notes: DE = Total Debt / Total Shareholder's Equity; DI = Total Debt / Total Assets; BS: Total number of 
directors; BI: Percentage of the board composed by independent directors; WB: Percentage of the board 
composed by women; CC: Considered as a dummy variable, in order to assess if the CEO and the 
Chairman are the same person or not; BM: Number of meetings held by the board per year; A: Number of 
years of existence of the company; SI: Natural logarithm of the number of firm's employees. 
*, ** and ***, indicate statistical significance of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
